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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I argue against a claim about pain which I call the “Minimization Thesis” or MT.  
According to MT, pain is objectively unconditionally intrinsically bad.  Using the case of grief, I 
claim that although MT may be true of pain as such, it is not true of particular pains.  I then turn 
to an examination of the justification provided by Thomas Nagel for offering the MT and find 
that his argument in its defense is inadequate because it depends on an implausible phenomenol-
ogy of pain experience.  I believe it is more plausible to claim, as Kant does, that pain has desire-
conditional badness.  Finally, I present a Nietzschean argument for the irreducible complexity of 
badness.  I suggest that we may be willing to concede pain’s badness only because it has not 
been specified what kind of badness it actually has. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Certainly when we reflect on the pain and suffering in the world, a thought that very of-
ten occurs is that something must be done about it.  Putting it that way may seem like an unders-
tatement.  To many, the suffering caused by any number of things like poverty, disease, and our 
treatment of animals is a central moral concern.  If those who devote themselves to alleviating 
suffering in these areas are not strictly duty-bound to do so, they are at least involved in some-
thing praiseworthy. (I take no position here on which.)  Peter Singer offers a characteristic treat-
ment of one such issue in his “Famine, Affluence, Morality”: 
I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medi-
cal care are bad.  I think most people will agree about this, although one may reach the 
same view by different routes.  I shall not argue for this view.  People can hold all sorts 
of eccentric positions, and perhaps from some of them it would not follow that death by 
starvation is in itself bad.  It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to refute such positions 
(Singer 1972, 231).1 
If there is nothing wrong with dismissing his critics, it would seem to be because that is what we 
do with people who challenge our basic moral assumptions, and what we are dealing with here is 
one of those.2  When it comes to forms of suffering like the ones he lists, we feel that something 
would have to go terribly awry in order for our desire to see them eliminated to be taken from us.  
                                                          
1 I don’t know what Singer’s account of the badness of death is, and I will not be investigating 
that issue here. 
2 Singer also says things that are in tension with the practice that he seems to be engaged in here.  
For example: “Philosophy ought to question the basic moral assumptions of the age.  Thinking 
through, critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I believe, the chief task of 
philosophy” (Singer 2002, 112). 
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If we consider these possibilities at all, we do so with something like horror and so it is a relief to 
be more or less asked to set such possibilities and the questions to which they lead us aside.3 
I want to resist the relief Singer offers from being troubled by such questions, though I 
will ask them not about suffering but about pain.  For Singer, as for many others, if suffering 
matters, it is because it is painful.  In that sense, the normative value of pain is more fundamental 
than the normative value of suffering, and so it makes more sense to investigate pain than suffer-
ing.  The unfortunate consequence of doing so is that if it turns out that suffering is significantly 
different from pain and that suffering is bad based on something other than its painfulness, I will 
have had nothing to say about suffering.4 
What I will investigate are the origin and basis of the normative attitudes we have about 
pain.  Present in Singer’s work is a desire or need to take pain’s badness for granted as an objec-
tive moral fact in order to have a starting point for moral theorizing.  He is clear that being se-
rious about moral theorizing (or, in his terms, not being an “eccentric” about it) is both compati-
                                                          
3 Once we have accepted the relief, there will still be a great deal of room for disagreement about 
just what sort of obligations we have when it comes to alleviating suffering of this kind.  For 
some people, it will seem that people who devote themselves to helping others in distant coun-
tries are doing something admirable but which could not reasonably be expected of everyone.  
For others, it will seem like meeting our basic responsibilities to others requires no less than such 
devotion; there is no special nobility in it, only indefensible prejudice, laziness and irrationality 
on the part of others who do not behave similarly. 
4 The word “suffer” has an etymological connotation of “to bear up under.”  Indeed, “suffer” can 
mean something very close to “allow” or “tolerate,” as in “Suffer the little children to come unto 
me.”  This suggests that suffering may necessarily involve an activity of will that could be trig-
gered by having to endure pain that lasts for some time.  We might think “pain” contrasts with 
“suffering” because it is a sensation, and does not necessarily involve the will in the same way.  I 
seek to complicate this understanding of pain in Section 3.  We might also think that to say 
someone is suffering is to make a claim about the way the person feels her life as a whole to be 
going whereas to say she is in pain does not (cf. Aitkin 2008, 170).  On the other hand, suffering 
can be used as a generic term for physical and emotional pain. 
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ble with this assumption and even that it requires it.5  I find myself susceptible to this way of 
thinking, but I also believe that genuine seriousness requires resisting it.  Contesting the view 
about pain’s value that I associate with Singer’s version of what seriousness requires is for me a 
way of opening the possibility of taking both pain and value seriously.  This thesis consists of a 
set of attempts to engage in this contestation. 
Let me then say exactly what the view is about pain that I have in mind to contest.  I will 
call the view the “Minimization Thesis.”  It has two linked components--axiological and deontic.  
How the two components are linked is not of central importance just yet.  Since a major purpose 
of my thesis is to criticize the Minimization Thesis, the reader should expect what it is meant to 
entail to be more clearly elaborated as the thesis continues.  For now, it will be sufficient to give 
a brief statement of it: 
Minimization Thesis: (1) Pain is unconditionally intrinsically bad.  (2) Rational agents 
have a non-derivative context-invariant agent-neutral pro tanto justificatory reason to mi-
nimize pain (whether through action or inaction). 
This view is significantly more modest than the view sometimes associated with Bentham’s utili-
tarianism, which claims that pain is the only unconditionally intrinsically bad thing such that its 
disvalue serves as the basis of all other badness in the world.  It also does not claim that every 
pain is bad and to-be-minimized.  The all-things-considered value of any particular pain may re-
sult from a balancing of that pain’s intrinsic value against its instrumental value.  The Minimiza-
tion Thesis does claim that pain is bad in a way that does not depend on whose pain it is (other-
                                                          
5 I imagine a professor explaining to his students that pain’s badness is an objective moral fact.  
A student asks, “Why should I believe that?”  In my imagination (as in my actual experience), if 
the professor does not actually say, “Come on, be serious,” there will at least be students who 
roll their eyes and slouch and generally express disdain for this student.  It is possible to set up a 
classroom environment in which this will be certain to happen, for example by talking about how 
bad it is to scald babies in hot water or torture pets for no reason.  It is also, I think, possible to 
set up a classroom environment in which this kind of dismissal would be very unlikely to hap-
pen.  The difference between the two classrooms would be one of the mood of inquiry.  Part of 
the idea of this thesis is to get into the second mood of inquiry. 
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wise pain’s badness would be conditional).  My pain may be bad for me in a way that supple-
ments its objective badness, but the Minimization Thesis is a claim about what pain is in itself, 
and that is not altered by facts about who is experiencing it. 
Among the contemporary philosophers I have read, Thomas Nagel is the most prominent 
figure to not just offer the Minimization Thesis but also defend it (Nagel 1980; 1986).  Irwin 
Goldstein offers a somewhat more elaborate defense (Goldstein 1980; 1989).6  Neil Sinhababu 
(2010) is also committed to it, and his defense of it is very similar to Goldstein and Nagel’s.7  I 
will sometimes refer to those who hold the Minimization Thesis as “Minimizers.”  Since the Mi-
nimization Thesis tends to seem obvious to those who defend it, it is very likely that many more 
people are Minimizers than have argued for the Minimization Thesis in print.  Indeed, Nagel re-
fers to his work in defending this view as “getting rid of the obstacles to the admission of the ob-
vious” and Goldstein admiringly quotes him on the point (Nagel 1980, 109; Goldstein 1989, 
257). 
1.1 Outline of the Argument 
My arguments will proceed according to the following plan.  In section 2, I put pressure on 
the Minimizers’ concept of pain.  I raise an objection from Troy Jollimore that leads to a dilem-
                                                          
6 Here is how Goldstein expresses the axiological component: “I believe pleasure and pain are 
unconditional, intrinsic values: in all times and places, cross-culturally and throughout the sen-
tient realm, every pleasure is good and every pain bad in itself” (Goldstein 1989, 257).  He puts 
the deontic component this way: “That all pain is intrinsically bad entails at most that we ought 
to avoid pain, or that hurting animals or people is wrong, when little is gained. … [It is] akin to 
‘there is reason to avoid X’” (259).  Elsewhere he specifies that the reason is “prima facie,” ter-
minology commonly used at the time in place of what we today call “pro tanto” (259). 
7 W. D. Ross (1930) holds a version of the Minimization Thesis that makes what I think 
Goldstein rightly claims is an unnecessary exception for pains which are “just desserts.”  I ex-
plain why I agree with Goldstein in Section 2.  Given his other beliefs about pain and badness, 
were he to correct his mistake on this point, he would be left accepting the Minimization Thesis.  
Thus, what I have to say in criticism of the Minimization Thesis (primarily in Sections 3 and 4) 
should apply to his version. 
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ma for the Minimizers such that they must either admit that certain pains are not intrinsically bad 
or specify “pain” in a way that dramatically reduces the scope of their claims.  In section 3, I turn 
to an evaluation of the Minimizers’ evidence that pain is intrinsically bad.  I contrast the Mini-
mizers’ view with what I think of as a Kantian view about the intrinsic value of pain.  Kant’s 
view is more commonsensical on this front, I think, since he holds that the badness of pain to us 
is dependent upon the empirical fact that we don’t like being in pain.  The Minimizers have two 
kinds of arguments intended to support their position against such Kantian objections, to which I 
will offer responses.  In section 4, I claim that intrinsic badness is not a univocal concept.  Pain 
can be taken to be intrinsically bad in ways that actually differ quite considerably from one 
another and are even, I will suggest, at odds with each other.  Since this is true, I claim that the 
apparent consensus about pain’s badness may only mask an underlying disagreement of some 
significance.  Not only that, but the Minimizers specify the content of the claim that pain is bad 
in a way that I think is wrong.  Rather than offering an alternative view of what kind of badness 
pain has to that of the Minimizers, I will claim our attitudes toward pain are likely to prove irre-
ducibly complex with regard to which kind of badness pain has at which time.  
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2 DEFINING PAIN SO AS TO MAKE THE MINIMIZATION THESIS WORK 
In this section I try to point out problems with specifying what the pains are to which the 
Minimization Thesis is supposed to apply without exception.  Although I will shortly show that 
Irwin Goldstein’s attempt at a definition of his terms is inadequate in more than one respect, he 
seems more than any other Minimizer to be interested in providing something more than an ex-
tensional definition of pain.  Goldstein claims the word “pain” refers to “every unpleasant expe-
rience” in which he includes “emotional pain and the localized sensations we call ‘pains’” 
(Goldstein 257).  He intends by this definition to suggest that unpleasantness is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for pain and also that unpleasantness is the essential feature of pain.  Thus, if 
pain is intrinsically bad it is because it is “unpleasant in itself and in this respect bad” (Goldstein 
257).  This corresponds to something we might imagine ourselves saying.  If somebody asked, 
“Why don’t you enjoy being in pain?” one could imagine responding, “Because it is unpleasant.” 
I think, however, that Goldstein’s definition of pain does not align with ordinary lan-
guage in other important respects.  No doubt we refer to certain emotions such as grief, depres-
sion and disappointment as pains (e.g. “Few things in this world compare to the pain of losing a 
child.”), and so I embrace that aspect of Goldstein’s account.  It marks a point of disagreement 
between himself and Nagel, who does not explain why but nonetheless limits his claims to 
“physical pain” (1986, 156).  On the other hand, treating unpleasantness as the essential feature 
of pain seems to me to be wrong.  Smelling a bad smell is surely an “unpleasant experience” but 
is not anything like a pain.  So some things are unpleasant without being painful. 
There does seem to be some relationship between the unpleasant and the painful, howev-
er.  We might think of the terms as degree concepts such that if some experience meets a thre-
shold of unpleasantness it becomes painful.  For example, the breakup of a romantic relationship 
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may be painful if the relationship was serious, but breaking up after only a short time may lead to 
no more than an unpleasant conversation.  If unpleasantness and painfulness are related in this 
way, it may be that each holds a place on a spectrum of sensations which are all of the same 
kind, but differ in degree.  If this were right, unpleasantness and painfulness would at least be of 
the same type and so Goldstein would be right in connecting them.  It would only be that sensa-
tions have to achieve a threshold of unpleasantness before they become unpleasant enough to 
count as pains. 
I don’t think that view is correct.  Pain is not just intense unpleasantness in this manner.  
Pains such as dull aches can be much less unpleasant than smells which would never be pains 
and yet retain their painfulness.  For this reason, it seems unlikely that one could establish a thre-
shold of unpleasantness beyond which something would count as a pain.  Still, it could be that 
pain is one species of the unpleasant.  This seems to me the most attractive view.  It is plausible 
that there are no examples of pains which are not unpleasant.8  Grief, migraine and toothache are 
only a few examples of pains, but each is in every case unpleasant.  Even if pain is a species of 
the unpleasant, this doesn’t necessarily imply anything about what its essence is.  In other words, 
we could call pain unpleasant without that being an account of what makes pain the thing that it 
is.  To develop such an account, one would want to pay attention to the importance that might be 
thought to lie in choosing to call torture “extremely painful” rather than “extremely unpleasant.”  
Regarding something as painful is importantly different from regarding it as unpleasant.  Consid-
er two examples: that of awkwardness and numbness.  I think that the feeling of social awkward-
ness is necessarily unpleasant, but not necessarily painful.  The social awkwardness that may fol-
low loud flatulence at an important dinner may be incredibly unpleasant to endure.  It surely is 
                                                          
8 Some might think masochism is an exception here, since the masochist takes pleasure in feeling 
pain.  I discuss this issue in Section 2 beginning on page 12. 
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the case that people will sometimes describe such awkwardness as “painful,” and yet the awk-
wardness is unpleasant in a manner quite distinct from any pain that it causes.  Indeed, it may 
become painful, as when the farter is so troubled by the unpleasant awkwardness that he runs off 
crying – but it may not resolve itself this way at all.  Some people are adept at resolving such 
tense situations into laughter.  If it is resolved that way, people will not later speak of how pain-
ful the experience was, though they may still note the awkwardness (and thereby call attention to 
unpleasantness).  What this example suggests is that unpleasantness can sometimes take the form 
of tension, and sometimes pain can take the form of a resolution of that tension. 
As another example, some people experience extreme kinds of emotional and physical 
numbness to the point of unbearable unpleasantness.  This can lead to a desire to inflict pain on 
oneself by burning or cutting oneself (just as bad smells or repeated inane music can lead one to 
bang one’s head against the wall).  The numbness may feel like a trap, and pain may be a way of 
breaking free from it.  That possibility depends on there being a difference between pain and 
numbness which is also intuitively plausible in its own right.9  We might say there is a point at 
which being numb becomes painful, (i.e. that it feels painful not to feel anything) and so numb-
ness is both painful and extremely unpleasant.  Even if that is true, the pain evidently is not what 
people are avoiding in the numbness, since they are choosing pain over it.  What makes more 
sense is to say they are using the pain to escape the numbness. 
                                                          
9 Another perspective would be that such cases involve a choice of less pain over more.  There 
may be some cases in which people do make choices of that sort, but this would be a bizarre way 
of understanding the case I have in mind.  What I am describing is a situation in which there is a 
desire to feel something (first-order feeling) motivated by the (second-order) unpleasantness of 
feeling nothing (first order).  Ignoring whatever difficulties may be thought to lie in the possibili-
ty of feeling that one is not feeling, clearly this choice is not between two states that are only sig-
nificantly different in degree. 
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The examples of awkwardness and numbness are meant to show that incredibly unplea-
sant experiences are a meaningfully different set of experiences from painful ones and thus that 
to call an experience painful means something different from calling it intensely unpleasant.  A 
further argument to that effect comes from an example of pains which are only moderately un-
pleasant, such as the pain associated with flexing a sore muscle.  Many people would find this 
less unpleasant than smelling natural gas, but think it is painful even though smelling natural gas 
is not.  At this point, I feel I can conclude that Goldstein goes wrong by tethering himself to 
thinking of pain in terms of unpleasantness.  Not only are there sensations which are unpleasant 
and not painful, but what makes an experience painful is not just how unpleasant it is. 
That said, it may well be that unpleasantness itself is intrinsically bad.  If so, then 
Goldstein’s view about the sensations he calls “pains” will turn out to be correct even though he 
is wrong to think he is talking about (what we ordinarily call) pain.  If all of the sensations we 
ordinarily call pain sensations turn out to also be unpleasant (for whatever reason), then 
Goldstein’s argument about unpleasant sensations will also imply that what would then be the 
narrower class of sensations we ordinarily call pains are also all intrinsically bad.  However, any 
badness that would result would be different from the sort of badness we might naturally asso-
ciate with pain in particular.  This shows up in differences in the vices we associate with unplea-
santness and pain.  As an example, consider the difference between rudeness and callousness.   
If someone is rude, (or crude, for that matter), the problem is that they are irritating to be 
around.  We call them unpleasant people.  They don’t follow the etiquette that allows social rela-
tions to go smoothly, so we sometimes also call them coarse.  They are like sand between one’s 
toes or like the sound of a fly buzzing around the room.  They stand too close or talk too loud or 
laugh too hard and it grates on us.  It doesn’t hurt per se, but all the same it is an obnoxious both-
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er.  If there is a corresponding vice associated with pain, it is callousness, which is quite different 
from rudeness.  People who are callous are so because of lack of sympathy with others’ pain and 
not just because of lack of smoothness.  The important difference for my purposes is that it could 
hardly be said of a callous person that the problem with her is that she is irritating, whereas this 
can sometimes be said of a rude person.  It is also clear that these vices can come apart and even 
conflict with one another whenever propriety (which is about being pleasant) conflicts with 
compassion (which is about concern for pain).  So, for example, it isn’t rude to be blunt when 
one has been asked to be, but even under that circumstance it may remain callous to state a harsh 
truth too directly or unhesitatingly.  In that sense, being too sharp with someone and being too 
coarse with them are quite different.  Similarly, a person can be rude without being callous if it is 
necessary out of concern for someone’s well-being to tell them a harsh truth under circumstances 
in which harshness is not considered proper.   
I believe the examples of rudeness and callousness are the vices of non-responsiveness to 
unpleasantness and pain respectively.  As such, their essential difference from one another sug-
gests that responsiveness to the badness of unpleasantness is different from responsiveness to the 
badness of pain.  This suggestion in turn tells against the possibility that pain’s badness could be 
explained in terms of its unpleasantness.  I think it follows that if we want to understand pain’s 
badness, rather than tethering it to unpleasantness, we should seek to clarify how it is essentially 
different from unpleasantness even though it may be a species thereof.  By doing so, we can be-
gin to see what is unique about it and essential to it.  Hopefully the remarks above help to sug-
gest how this can be done. 
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2.1 The Case of Grief 
At this point, I want to turn to a specific criticism of the Minimization Thesis from Troy 
Jollimore to the effect that grief is a pain in Goldstein’s sense (and in the ordinary sense of that 
term) to which the Minimization Thesis does not apply.  In introducing this criticism, it is impor-
tant to differentiate it from other criticisms to which Minimizers have, in my view, already given 
an adequate response. 
The most straightforward intuitions to the effect that in certain cases pain seems to have 
some goodness associated with it result from considering examples such as the following: 
• physical pain that alerts one to ongoing or potential damage to one’s body,  
• the pain that criminals feel when they are justly punished,  
• the masochist’s “pleasurable pains.” 
In my view, those who hold the Minimization Thesis are able to give a sufficiently plausible ac-
count of such cases that this avenue of criticism turns out not to be a promising one.  I don’t want 
to commit to their account of all these cases being correct, but I don’t think these considerations 
are such that Minimizers can be forced to abandon their claims about pain as a result of them.  
Goldstein’s defense against such examples is that in all cases where pain appears to have some 
value other than badness, the pain itself occurs in an admixture with other elements which serve 
to override intuitions about what the pain is on its own (Goldstein 1989, 256, 258, 263-264).  In 
all of the cases listed above, the pain can be said to have some positive instrumental value that 
overrides its intrinsic badness thus resulting in the pain’s all-things-considered goodness.10  For 
example, pain is said to be good insofar as it helps people avert injury, but this usefulness of pain 
                                                          
10 Some people wrongly believe that intrinsic value cannot be overridden by instrumental value.  
I won’t argue against that here, but my acceptance of Goldstein’s argument on this point depends 
on its falsity. 
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has nothing to do with its intrinsic value, which is said to be determined by how it feels (i.e. un-
pleasant).  Similarly, what is said to be good about the pain of punishment is not the pain itself, 
but that the pain has the effect of justly punishing a criminal.  If such pain is good in itself, it is 
only as just punishment that it is so, and not as pain.11  Just as pain would not as effectively deter 
us from life-threatening behaviors were it not unpleasant (and therefore bad) in itself, so too 
would pain be a poor punishment if it weren’t unpleasant (Goldstein 1989, 258).  It is thus the 
very intrinsic badness of pain (i.e. its unpleasantness) that allows it to be put to many of its good 
uses. 
 The case of the masochist is the most complex of the three because there are different 
ways of understanding what the case actually involves.  On one account of masochism, the pains 
the masochist feels simply are not unpleasant to him but actually pleasant.  I think this must be 
wrong.  If it were right, then what we should say about the masochist is that he feels pleasure in 
response to the same physiological stimuli that normally produce an experience of pain.  If he is 
not feeling pain, however, then he becomes a non-issue for the Minimizers, who are making a 
claim only about what feeling pain is like. 
Suppose, then, that the masochist is feeling pain, and that he takes pleasure in the feeling 
of pain and takes the fact that being whipped (for example) will be painful to be a reason to get 
whipped.  In that case, the same instrumental approach as above seems to apply.  It seems that 
the masochist wants the pain because it will bring him pleasure, and if that is true, it has only in-
strumental value to him, not intrinsic value.  That seems right enough.  It is hard to imagine 
someone being a masochist without relishing a certain amount in the experience of the pain.  
                                                          
11 It is only because he does not accept this point that W. D. Ross does not argue for the Minimi-
zation Thesis in his The Right and the Good (Ross 1930, 112).  Since this is a mistake, Ross 
should, in light of his other commitments, be a Minimizer. 
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Still, suppose for the sake of argument that the masochist really does just want the pain for its 
own sake.  The Minimizers do not deny that such a thing is possible.  They only claim that “a 
person who enjoys pain likes what is manifestly bad,” so a masochist of this sort would be ap-
propriately considered a “deviant” (Goldstein 1989, 265).  Finally, even if the Minimizers did 
have to claim that nobody finds pain desirable in itself, they seem to have some grounds for 
doing so.  There are no masochists who simply enjoy any and all experiences of pain.  Instead, 
they seem to enjoy it only in certain contexts.  This suggests the possibility that in these contexts, 
the pain takes on some significance that it nevertheless does not contain “in itself.”  For example, 
it might come to signify humiliation or punishment to the masochist and so the masochist seeks it 
out. 
Although I find Goldstein’s response to such examples to be adequate, I believe Troy Jol-
limore has succeeded in developing a more sophisticated and promising counterexample in the 
form of grief.  In his 2004 article “Meaningless Happiness and Meaningful Suffering,” Jollimore 
attempts to show that grief is a member of a species of pains he calls “meaningful suffering,” the 
unpleasantness of which he says, “does not entail that the experience is entirely lacking in value, 
let alone disvaluable.  Nor does it imply that there is a duty, or any moral reason whatsoever, to 
erase such suffering from existence” (Jollimore 344).  While he accepts that such suffering may 
be experienced as something “bad” (i.e. it may be disliked), he questions whether such badness 
intrinsically merits such dislike and denies that it provides even a pro tanto reason for avoiding 
the feeling of grief. 
This claim may seem odd.  Why doesn’t the way grief feels give us a reason not to want 
to grieve or to want not to grieve?  Jollimore’s response to this question depends on his some-
what controversial view that some emotions including grief are cognitive.  If grief is a “cognitive 
14 
 
emotion” claims Jollimore, then what matters about it is not whether we like the way it feels, but 
whether it accurately represents the world.  In essence, the idea is that acknowledgment of a hard 
truth does not always merely require me to feel some pain which is nonetheless separate from 
that truth and thus possible to evaluate separately from it as a necessary evil.  Instead, sometimes 
my acknowledgement of the death of a loved one just takes the form of the pain that I feel.  If 
this is correct, feeling the pain is not an instrument I am using to bring about knowledge (some-
thing good) nor is it a result of such knowledge.  Instead, the pain I feel constitutes my acknowl-
edgment of the loved one’s death. 
Jollimore’s claim that grief is cognitive is controversial because there is a common way 
of thinking about cognitive states according to which they must be propositional and grief is not 
evidently propositional.  Jollimore’s defense of his broader view of what should count as cogni-
tive is based on Frank Jackson and Thomas Nagel’s arguments for the existence of non-
propositional knowledge of what “a certain experience (seeing red, for instance) is like” (Jolli-
more 341).  He also offers a thought experiment of his own about a woman, Melissa, who is 
normal except that she is “incapable of grief” and thus does not grieve at all when her friend Bob 
dies (339).  Asked about her peculiar lack of feeling, she says, 
I know people generally feel terrible when these things happen.  But eventually they get 
over it and realize that things aren’t so bad.  Life is short: why not start feeling good 
now?  I’ll miss Bob, it’s true.  But I’ll make new friends soon enough, and they will be 
able to provide me with all the goods, emotional and otherwise, that Bob used to provide.  
In fact, like most people in our society I already have more than enough friends; I can af-
ford to lose one or two (Jollimore 339). 
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In such a case, says Jollimore, whatever else we might say, we certainly will say that she doesn’t 
“understand what it is to lose a friend” (Jollimore 340).  The sense of “meaningful” in Jolli-
more’s claim that grief is “meaningful suffering,” then, is not that there is some meaning which 
provides a reason for suffering the pain of grief.  Instead, the pain of grief lies within under-
standing what it is to lose a loved one.  Because this pain is therefore cognitive, its unpleasant-
ness is irrelevant in deciding what, if any, reasons it may give: its value is determined according 
to a criterion other than how it feels, namely, whether or not it is “appropriate.”  The reason it 
matters that grief be cognitive in order for Jollimore’s account to work is that we do not evaluate 
cognitive states like beliefs, for example, according to how they feel or how they make us feel.  
Doing so would result in wishful thinking.  If grief is a cognitive state, then Jollimore can claim 
that criteria for epistemic justification apply to when one ought or ought not to feel it.  What it 
actually feels like will not factor in to that justification and so is not a reason to avoid it.  It seems 
that what Jollimore means to indicate by employing the concept of the “appropriate” as a crite-
rion for when one ought to feel pain is that some circumstances call for grief and others do not, 
such that one should feel grief when the circumstances call for it.  This may turn out to be an in-
adequate view of how grief can or should work.  It may be possible to develop a more sophisti-
cated account of when one ought to grieve.  Such issues are of merely tangential importance so 
long as one accepts it is possible to have pains that are cognitive in nature, and that should there-
fore be morally assessed not according to how they feel, but according to other cognitive criteria. 
 The first of three possible objections to Jollimore’s view that I will consider here would 
state that there are cognitive pains which we do have reason to avoid simply because of how they 
feel.  A possible example might be the cognitive dissonance associated with holding inconsistent 
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beliefs.12  Someone raising such an objection would surely claim that people have reasons not to 
maintain inconsistent beliefs regardless of whether or not it was painful to do so, but they would 
also claim that the fact that maintaining inconsistent beliefs is painful is a separate reason for not 
maintaining them.  Thus, on such a view, people who suffer from cognitive dissonance have 
more reason than those who do not for avoiding inconsistent beliefs.  So long as cognitive dis-
sonance is understood as a cognitive emotion, I do not think this view of our obligations with 
respect to it is attractive.  If it is the correct view of cognitive dissonance, it must be because 
cognitive dissonance is not a cognitive emotion.  To see why, consider that for cognitive disson-
ance to be a cognitive emotion, it would have to be that to feel cognitive dissonance is to know 
what it is to have (these particular) inconsistent beliefs.  (Remember, grief is a cognitive emotion 
because to feel or to have felt grief under the appropriate circumstances is part of knowing what 
it is to have lost (this particular) person.)  Conceptually, then, to say both that cognitive disson-
ance is a cognitive emotion and that one has a reason to avoid cognitive dissonance implies that 
one has a reason to avoid knowing what it is to have inconsistent beliefs.  Nobody would hold 
such a view, particularly not someone who thought that the feeling of cognitive dissonance was 
itself a reason not to hold inconsistent beliefs.  Such a person might want to claim that cognitive 
dissonance is separate from the knowledge of what it is to have inconsistent beliefs and is a rea-
son to stop holding inconsistent beliefs separate from the fact that those beliefs are inconsistent.  
I don’t believe that view is correct because regardless of what in fact motivates people to believe 
or renounce beliefs, I think it is false that one could justify holding or not holding beliefs because 
of the way it makes one feel to do so.  The matter is of no great importance here, because such a 
                                                          
12 Thanks to Andrew J. Cohen for this objection. 
17 
 
view would be compatible with Jollimore’s view that cognitive emotions are not to be judged by 
how they feel. 
 A second possible objection to Jollimore’s view is that he is wrong to treat grief as an 
emotion that just is a cognitive state, since the difference in kind between what is cognitive and 
what is emotional makes it impossible that any such thing as a cognitive emotion exists.  Be-
cause the ontological status of emotions is a serious philosophical topic in itself, it is appropriate 
here only to mark that showing the impossibility of cognitive emotions would undermine his 
claim.  Resolving this issue is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
A third difficulty with Jollimore’s view lies in the still open possibility of claiming that 
grief is not just “a pain” but is a specific type of pain that is what it is not just in virtue of its be-
ing a pain but also in virtue of something else that makes it specifically grief and not, say, a 
burning sensation.  If it is possible to draw a conceptual distinction between the unpleasantness 
or painfulness of grief and the grief itself, it might be asserted that even though grief is pain, 
grief qua grief has a different status than grief qua pain.  Goldstein offers an argument of this 
sort in response to the claim that malice, a type of pleasure, is intrinsically bad.  He says, “Malice 
could be intrinsically bad because of its pleasantness without the pleasantness in malice being 
intrinsically bad” (Goldstein 1989, 270).  The analogous claim in the case of grief would be that 
grief is appropriate (when it is appropriate) because of its unpleasantness (which, remember, is 
cognitive) but that the unpleasantness of grief is not, on its own, intrinsically something “appro-
priate.”  The trouble with Goldstein putting forth such an argument about grief is that the distinc-
tion between the badness of malice and the goodness of pleasure depends on malice not being 
reducible to pleasure, and so too would a similar distinction between the intrinsic value of grief 
and the badness of pain.  Consequently, this response is only available to someone who has re-
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sources for denying that grief simply is pain.  If this is so, then we can no longer take Goldstein’s 
definition of “pain” as “every unpleasant experience” at face value, because grief is an unplea-
sant experience and grief is not here being treated as pain.  It does seem that this would be cor-
rect: grief is pain but not just pain.  But in this case, we need to find a new, much more restrictive 
definition of pain. 
Whatever the more restrictive definition would be, it will end up having fairly broad im-
plications about what the Minimization Thesis entails.  Since every particular pain will be some 
particular kind of pain consisting of pain plus something else that makes it the specific type of 
pain that it is, none of the pains we have will just be pain and so none will necessarily be intrin-
sically bad.  Although this contradicts Goldstein’s version of the Minimization Thesis because of 
his definition of pain as every unpleasant experience (i.e. each particular pain), it is nonetheless 
possible to construe the Minimization Thesis differently so that it speaks only of the value of 
pain, and not of the value of particular pains.  In that case, the pain we have reason to avoid is 
not every unpleasant experience, or even every painful experience but only that aspect of such 
experiences which makes them painful experiences.  If we think about particular pains, it is clear 
enough that they at least involve sensations.  It is less clear what the abstract essence of pain 
feels like or even whether it can meaningfully be thought of as a sensation.  It seems our most 
direct access to it is through the particular examples of pain we experience or witness, and any-
thing we can say about the intrinsic value of these pains qua painfulness is going to require us to 
view these objects in a certain light rather than just taking them for what they are.  This will turn 
out to be important in countering one argument meant to show that pain is intrinsically bad.  This 
argument will be taken up in Section 3. 
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We can now conclude this portion of the investigation.  Goldstein’s understanding of pain as 
“every unpleasant sensation” is simply not going to work if the Minimization Thesis is going to 
hold water.  This is in part because unpleasantness and painfulness are not identical phenomena 
and sometimes do not overlap.  Although there are cases of unpleasantness without pain, perhaps 
Goldstein could maintain the broad outlines of his view by holding that something’s being “pain” 
is a sufficient but not necessary condition for its being an “unpleasant experience.”  He could 
then say that there is something in particular about pain such that its unpleasantness makes it bad 
or he could say that unpleasantness as such is bad.  It is not clear which he should do.  In either 
case, I think that in the face of Jollimore’s style of counter-argument, he should abandon his ap-
parent view that “every” sensation which is appropriately labeled a pain or appropriately labeled 
unpleasant is intrinsically bad.  Questions then arise which Goldstein is poorly equipped to ad-
dress.  They are: on what basis can we make claims about pain as such or talk about its intrinsic 
value?  More specifically, on what basis could we claim that it is unconditionally intrinsically 
bad?  These questions will be the focus of the third section.  
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3 EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST UNCONDITIONAL BADNESS 
Every instance of the Minimization Thesis I have seen clearly holds that pain is undesira-
ble (i.e. not-to-be-desired), and is so in itself.  That is a crucial part of what the axiological part 
of the minimization thesis is meant to convey.  We should avoid pain for the sake of avoiding 
pain, and not just for the sake of doing something else.  For example, Neil Sinhababu (who al-
leges symmetry between pain’s badness and pleasure’s goodness) writes, “On my view, the 
goodness of pleasure is an intrinsic feature of the experience, not merely a relation to the expe-
riencer’s desires or evaluative dispositions” (Sinhababu 2010, 27).  This stands in opposition to a 
perspective from which people might be tempted to think that pain is intrinsically bad but which 
is incompatible with the Minimization Thesis.  The view I have in mind claims two things.  The 
first claim is that everybody either does dislike pain or would dislike it or have a disposition or 
inclination to avoid it under some “ideal” circumstances (e.g. her desires are not perverted by 
unfortunate sexual history, she has not been lobotomized).  The second claim is that we have a 
pro tanto reason to satisfy our desires (or the desires we would have under specified circums-
tances).  Now, the fact that people dislike pain or would dislike it under the right circumstances 
is clearly an extrinsic fact about pain.13  On this view, one should avoid pain for the sake of satis-
fying one’s desires.  Pain is bad, but not intrinsically so because its badness is derivative of and 
                                                          
13 There is a view that would claim that the feeling of pain is a result of a negative judgment 
about a sensation or emotion.  On this view, to feel pain is just to feel one’s dislike of something.  
Even on that view, however, there is a distinction made between the “passive” judgment in-
volved in the sensation of pain, and the “active” judgment of reflecting on the pain and judging 
that one dislikes it.  For the desire-based view about pain that I describe above to be relevantly 
different from the Minimization Thesis, it will either need to claim that the desires we have rea-
son to act in accordance with are “active” ones, rather than the supposed “passive ones” that are 
sometimes thought to constitute pain itself or else claim that pains are not the result of passive 
judgments and instead hold with the Minimizers that pains are sensations like sensations of yel-
low or green.  I don’t consider this view extensively because I think we should deny that pains 
result from passive judgments, and I don’t think there are any Minimizers who would disagree. 
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conditional upon a desire to avoid pain.  If someone asks, “Why do you disvalue/seek-to-
minimize pain?” on this view, there is a response: “Well, I don’t like being in pain.”  That for the 
sake of which one would be acting is not the avoidance of pain as such but the satisfaction of 
one’s desire.14  Kant seems to think this is exactly why people avoid pain, and has picked up on 
the necessary implication that pain does not have any intrinsic disvalue, which, I take it, is part of 
the reason for his rejection of utilitarianism.  Thus he wrote in the Groundwork: 
All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and 
the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But 
the inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute 
worth for which they should be desired, that on the contrary it must be the universal 
wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object 
which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional (Kant 56). 
So the Kantian position is that pain has desire-conditional intrinsic badness—its badness is con-
ditional on our desires.  Both Goldstein and Thomas Nagel acknowledge explicitly that they 
mean the Minimization Thesis to be at odds with this Kantian view.15  In “Limits of Objectivity,” 
Nagel writes, of a hypothetical person in pain, that “he wants [pain] to go away because it’s bad: 
it is not made bad by his deciding that he wants it to go away” (Nagel 1980, 109).  Similarly, 
Goldstein, who holds that there is a symmetrical relation between the value of pleasure and pain, 
is very clear on this point: “Pleasure’s being good precedes our desire for it and is our reason for 
desiring it” (Goldstein 1980, 353). 
                                                          
14 If it turns out that we dislike pain “for its own sake,” it may be open to the Minimizers to re-
spond that that our desire is based on a perception of pain’s value.  I will consider this objection 
below. 
15 Although each of these authors claims his position is obvious, the mere fact that Kant did not 
hold the same position would seem to suggest against its having that status. 
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In spite of such claims, I think the attractiveness of the Minimization Thesis might de-
pend in part on an illicit attempt to confuse desire-conditional and unconditional badness.  In The 
View from Nowhere, Nagel uses language that strongly suggests unconditional badness (as he 
had in the earlier Tanner Lectures), but he also writes occasionally as if pain’s badness were 
based on our “immediate and strong dislike” of it (Nagel 1986, 158).  In one place he states, 
“Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as 
subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not backed up by any further rea-
sons” (Nagel 1986, 156).  In another, “We have reason to seek/avoid sensations we immediately 
and strongly like/dislike….The fact that physical pleasures and pains are experiences, and that 
our desires and aversions for them are immediate and unreflective, puts them in a special catego-
ry” (Nagel 1986, 158).  In the first quotation above, he says the badness of pain is not based on 
“any further reasons,” and in the second, he specifies a reason that pain is bad, namely that it is a 
sensation we “immediately and strongly dislike.”16  What he elides with such language is that his 
first claim (and the Minimization Thesis) entails that even if someone did not dislike pain, that 
person would still have a reason to “avoid” pain whereas in his second claim, such a person does 
not have such reason.17  Since it will turn out that Nagel believes pain’s badness (once estab-
lished) should be thought of as agent-neutral such that it provides a reason not just for those in 
pain but for all rational agents, this will mean that even if someone is not bothered by being in 
pain, rational agents will have a reason to minimize that person’s pain.  Indeed, if pain’s badness 
                                                          
16 It is not my purpose here to resolve disagreements about what type of desire-based account of 
value is the most attractive, but I want to register my sense that the idea that we should rely on 
unreflective, visceral desires more than reflective, considered desires in deciding what we have 
reason to do seems to me misguided in the extreme.   
17 Oddly, Kearns and Star claim explicitly and without defending it that someone’s being indiffe-
rent to his own suffering counts against giving him a painkiller but is both not a reason not to 
give him a painkiller and does not undo the reason we have to give him the painkiller, which is 
that he is in pain (Kearns forthcoming, 10). 
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is unconditional, then even if there were no sentient creatures with an “involuntary aversion” to 
pain, all the rational creatures would still have duties based on the Minimization Thesis.  I find 
this to be so bizarre that it counts as decisive evidence against the Minimizer’s view.  It is thus 
important that Minimizers be able to respond. 
One response the Minimizers might try is to suggest that any thought experiment involv-
ing a hypothetical world in which rational creatures feel pain that they don’t dislike begs the 
question against them, or comes close.  Rational creatures are by definition both able to see the 
reasons there are in the world, and also motivated to act in accordance with them (at least accord-
ing to an internalist about reasons like Nagel).  As a result, the stipulation that there are rational 
creatures who don’t dislike pain has the illicit implication that they don’t take it to be bad, but 
this would entail an implausibly widespread non-responsiveness to reasons on the part of suppo-
sedly rational agents.  In other words, Minimizers might seek to claim that a world in which ra-
tional creatures do not dislike pain is not just incidentally different than ours, but a world gone 
mad.  That is to say, such a world, on their view, would be a world in which rational creatures 
consistently behaved irrationally in spite of their rationality. 
That response seems to me obviously false, but the reason it seems false to me is that I 
think it is just obvious that we might not have been designed to respond with such hostility to the 
sensations we call pain.  It is reasonable to think that the reason we respond to pain as we do is 
that we have evolved to do so.  Broadly, what seems important from the perspective of evolution 
is simply that there are some sensations that we will be able to interpret as signs of potential 
damage to our bodies (like burning sensations) and that also have the ability to thwart our at-
tempts to do certain potentially damaging things (like walking on sprained ankles).  To think that 
there had to be something internal to the sensation of pain in order for it to perform these roles 
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seems unjustified.  Instead, it seems like any sensation would be able to play the part of pain 
equally well so long as it is possible for the creature to adapt so that it is intolerant of that sensa-
tion (i.e. so long as it is able to render the sensation aversive or unpleasant). 
As an analogy, we might think about the way foods taste.  Suppose it comes about that 
evolutionary pressure makes it more likely we will survive if we make a conscious effort to eat 
foods that contain a certain chemical.  There are two things our bodies would have to do if they 
were going to adapt to this pressure.  First, if it isn’t already present, equipment that can detect 
the chemical and represent it in consciousness through a sensation would have to be added (for 
example, taste buds that produce a sensation when the chemical is present in the mouth).  
Second, there would have to be a mechanism to encourage us to pursue this sensation.  One sim-
ple way to do this would be to make it so that we love feeling the sensation and are inclined to 
pursue it.  This seems like a plausible explanation of how it came to be that we enjoy eating sug-
ar.  Our bodies developed the ability to detect it through sweetness, and we also became inclined 
to enjoy the sensation of sweetness.  It would be silly to insist that our desire for sweetness is the 
result of a perception of sweetness’s intrinsic goodness.  If sugar had been bad for us, we would 
either have experienced a different sensation when eating it, or else we would not have expe-
rienced sweetness as being so darn enjoyable.  Which difference would be more likely just de-
pends on the practical issue of what change would be physiologically easier or harder to imple-
ment.  If there even is such a thing as an “in itself” of sweetness apart from its functional role, 
still there is no intrinsic value of the sensation of sweetness such that it would have been imposs-
ible for us to come to dislike it.  Again, it would seem silly for a philosopher to insist that it 
would be impossible for us not to like sweet things.  The same is true when it comes to pain.  If it 
has an essential nature aside from its functional role in us such that we can talk about what it is in 
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itself, nonetheless, it seems that how we do respond to it is dependent on the functional role in 
plays in our lives and on whatever mechanism we have developed that makes us dislike it.  It 
does not seem to be that we dislike it based on a rational perception of what it is in itself apart 
from our physiological response system.  We feel the way we do about pain because pain is the 
output of our mechanism for detecting things in the world which are bad for us and, in order for 
that mechanism to work, we have to be hardwired to find that sensation aversive.  If during our 
evolutionary history it had been good for us to be damaged, it would be hard to know whether 
we would feel the same sensation but enjoy it or whether we would feel a different sensation. 
There are two possible objections to my view that I will consider here.  The first objec-
tion might be that to speak of pain as a sensation apart from our aversiveness to it is wrong be-
cause the sensation of pain is what it is in part as a result of the aversion we have to it.  When we 
feel pain, we are always already feeling our aversion to the pain that we are feeling and the sen-
sation is just the felt expression of our aversion.  I think if this is right, it would tell against the 
Minimizers just as much as the considerations above do.  If what makes a pain a pain is some 
kind of primary aversion which is brought into feeling in the sensation that results from it, then 
the value or disvalue of the primary aversion that stimulated a pain would seem to play a key role 
in determining whether that pain was something good or bad.  In that case, the value of a pain 
would vary along with that of the primary aversion out of which it originated.  It would be quite 
plausible to suppose that this primary aversion would turn out to be something like the organ-
ism’s aversion to its own death and destruction,18 and whether that aversion has any merit would 
clearly depend on the organism. 
                                                          
18 Here I am quite close to what Korsgaard has to say about pain in Sources of Normativity 
(1996; 145-160). 
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The second objection might state that the only sensations we are currently inclined to 
avoid are the painful ones, and the fact that these sensations have their painfulness in common 
suggests that there must have been something special about pain such that it was the sensation 
chosen by natural selection in each case.  I have two responses to this argument.  The first re-
sponse is that its premise is false.  There are many sensations we are inclined to avoid that are 
not painful.  Bad smells, bad tastes and ugliness are just three.  The second response is that even 
if we only avoided pain and no other sensation, it would be possible that this was because the 
difficulties associated with developing new sensory equipment make it such that once a sensation 
is used to indicate one kind of unfriendly stimulus it is easier to use that same sensation to indi-
cate other unfriendly stimuli than to both introduce new detection equipment and a new means of 
ensuring the signal produced by that equipment will be disliked. 
3.1 The Argument from the Immediacy of Pain’s Badness 
Even if it seems the Minimizers are in trouble when it comes to defending the implausi-
ble consequences of their view when it comes to counterfactual worlds in which people do not 
dislike pain, perhaps they have some positive evidence that could motivate us to want to accept 
their view even with its otherwise apparently implausible consequences.  There are two such ar-
guments I will consider here.  The first has to do with what it is like to experience a pain, which 
is the subject of this sub-section.  The second is a more indirect argument seeking to prove pain 
is bad by the fact that we desire not to be in pain; I discuss that in the next sub-section.  As far as 
the first argument is concerned, here is what Nagel has to say: 
There is nothing self-contradictory in the proposal [that our aversion to pain is just a use-
ful phobia], but it seems nevertheless insane.  …  [Pleasure and pain] are at least good or 
bad for us, if anything is.  What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an ob-
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jective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and imme-
diate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own conscious-
ness.  We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, 
nonideological evaluative impressions (1986, 157-158).19 
Nagel’s approach here is suggestive and leads to interesting responses.  He claims that there is 
something like an immediate judgment made about pain’s badness from within the experience of 
pain and that this experience is not subject to revision based on considerations that could be 
brought to bear when one steps back from that experience.  Nagel refers to this as the “evaluative 
authority of the sufferer” (1986, 161).  Whatever the merit of the first claim that there is an im-
mediate judgment that pain is at least subjectively bad (and I’m not sure this claim would stand 
up to critical investigation), here I want to cast doubt on the evaluative authority and conceptual 
coherence of the sufferer’s “immediate evaluative impression” of pain. 
My first point is that we do not think people who are in pain are able to think clearly 
about their pain and evaluate it just for that reason.  Being in pain is something that tends to in-
volve distortions in one’s view of the world and one’s place in it and also of the place of pain in 
the world.  Aristotle uses the example of boxers to indicate this point.  He says that the “end that 
accords with courage would seem to be pleasant, but to be obscured by the circumstances” (NE 
1117b1).  As an example of how circumstances obscure, he says that boxers box in order to win 
prizes and fame, but as they are boxing “the painful aspects are many” and these appear to “leave 
the end for which it is all done without anything pleasant about it” (NE 1117b1).  Although 
phrased in hedonistic terms, I think Aristotle’s claim here amounts to saying that pain has the 
                                                          
19 Compare with Sinhababu: “Simply experiencing intense pain is a perfectly legitimate way to 
become aware of its moral significance as a bad state of affairs.  We can say that a sufferer of 
pain has a firsthand experience of how bad it is that she is in pain” (forthcoming, 35). 
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ability to cloud our vision of what is valuable to us, and that having courage means resisting that 
influence of pain or continuing on in spite of it.   
Further evidence of the phenomenon I have in mind is the existence of torture as an inter-
rogation technique.  Torturers seek to take advantage of the way that the experience of pain has 
the ability to alter our perspective of the world and of ourselves.  They act on the hope that being 
subjected to pain will tempt or force us to re-evaluate or abandon whatever strongly held com-
mitments keep us from revealing what we know.  Even if torture is not ultimately the most effec-
tive way to get information from someone, torturers have not simply lost their minds in holding 
out this hope.  To take the perspective of a sufferer on the value of one’s life, one’s principles or 
one’s projects will surely mean to judge them all differently than one would in the light of calm 
reason.  If this were not true, we would accept the decisions of depressed people that their lives 
are not worth living as valid.  Instead, we do not think that depressed people are in a position to 
make claims about the value of their lives.  We expect them to fight against that impression and 
to continue to struggle on. 
Now perhaps Nagel would understand the sorts of considerations I have just given as 
casting doubt on our ability when in pain to judge its importance relative to other things in our 
lives.  That would seem to be consistent with Aristotle.  If the only problem is that the immedia-
cy with which we feel pain (or with which pain demands that we feel it) puts us in a bad position 
to weigh the badness of pain against other considerations we might ordinarily have, then so far 
we have said nothing that contradicts Nagel.  After all, his claim is not that we can see how im-
portant pain is relative to other things by being in it, but rather that we can see that it is bad for us 
by being in it.  My suggestion in response is this: if much of what we can learn about the world 
when we are in pain is wrong or anyway is to be rejected, then why allow that epistemic position 
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to end up having final say about pain’s value?20  Nagel is trying to claim, based on the sufferer’s 
evaluative authority, that pain is not just bad in an agent-relative way, but an agent-neutral way, 
and not just bad but unconditionally bad.  For pain’s badness to be agent-neutral means that it is 
not just bad “for me” that I am in pain, but is instead simply a bad state of affairs whenever any-
one is in pain such that everyone has a reason to do something about it.  Yet, if it really is the 
case that when we are not suffering it seems to us that pain is bad for those who are suffering but 
not for others, then why would we want to suspend that judgment in favor of the judgment made 
by someone in the heat of passion that his pain was important to all equally?  Why not rather 
suspect that the sufferer’s sense of his pain’s absolute importance in his own life is one version 
of the tendency to over-estimate pain’s importance when in the grip of it?  If it seems to the suf-
ferer that all that matters is that the pain stop and if it seems to the sufferer that this depends on 
nothing (i.e. is an unconditional imperative), why not take that as yet another emphatic overesti-
mation of pain’s importance?  Pain can be consuming in this way.  It wants attention, and we 
know it, and we have no choice but to offer it, and even once we have given it our attention, it 
still wants more.  But it is desperation to so wantonly give in to pain’s demands.  Courage re-
quires us to hold back from taking pain’s view of what ought to matter to whom and how much. 
All of this brings me to my second point against Nagel’s way of accounting for how we 
can see that the axiological component of the Minimization Thesis is true, which is that I think it 
                                                          
20 What Nagel says is not that our immediate judgments directly decide pain’s final importance 
in our lives.  He thinks values are ultimately determined by how things seem to us from the 
“view from nowhere” (aka the “objective standpoint”).  In this case, that turns out to be a moot 
point because, as I have already quoted him saying, he thinks that “we cannot from an objective 
standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective 
value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness.  We regard our-
selves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative 
impressions” (1986, 157-158).  In effect, then, our immediate impressions get the first say, and 
once they have had a say there is nothing strong enough to overturn them so we will have to “en-
dorse” those impressions from the objective standpoint. 
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is mistaken to speak of our judgment of pain’s badness as an immediate one.  In order for an 
immediate judgment to take place, there has to be a judging subject that stands in a direct rela-
tionship to the object it judges.  Even as the subject is separate from the object, there is no barrier 
separating them.  In the case of pain, no such relationship is possible.  To stand in an immediate 
relationship to one’s pain is to be consumed by it and thus to be rendered incapable of judgment.  
As a result, we are able to judge pain at all only when we have mediated our relationship to it.  
This is a fairly abstract point, but it will hopefully become clearer with an example. 
If I am carrying a very hot pot filled with my family’s dinner across a room, and I dis-
cover about halfway through the task that the pot is noxiously hot as it begins to burn my hands, 
it will be a struggle to get across the room without dropping it.  Even as I want to make it across 
the room with the pot, I will be filled with a desire to let go of it.  As this desire increases, I may 
judge it to be worth resisting and thus continue on, or I may decide that it isn’t worth it and drop 
the pot.  On the other hand, if the pain is bad enough or if I am weak-willed enough or surprised 
enough by it, I may reflexively drop the pot without having the chance to consider the best 
course of action.  In the former case, what I do will count as my response to the pain based on 
my judgment of it.  In the latter case, I am not responding to pain, but instead overwhelmed by it 
such that I am rendered passive with respect to it.  The fact that pain which catches us off-guard 
will overwhelm us points to an important aspect of pain’s significance to us: that we have to steel 
ourselves in the face of it (consciously or unconsciously) in order to allow ourselves the possibil-
ity of a response to it whereby we could put it in its proper place within the context of our lives. 
In what might “steeling ourselves” against pain consist?  It does not consist in a tepid 
avoidance of the hostile forces of the world.  Instead, it involves having tasks and values and 
projects that one holds dear.  Whether I am able to endure carrying a pot when it is painful to do 
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so depends a great deal on how important it is to me to complete the task.  If the task is not that 
important to me, the pain may quickly feel unbearable and I won’t be able to do anything about 
it.  It will overwhelm me and I will succumb to it.  On the other hand, if a pot I am carrying has 
my infant brother in it, almost no pain I could feel would be enough to make me drop it.21  If the 
pain of carrying the pot with my brother in it catches me totally by surprise, it is true, I may drop 
it, but even if I can anticipate the pain, I will also need to have some project in place if I am to 
have any hope of not being overcome by it.  If instead I allowed myself to be reduced to being 
merely a sufferer of pain, the pain would be crippling and the pot would be dropped.  By having 
a project in which I am engaged, I may be able to keep from being only the one who suffers and 
thus preserve some part of myself from consumption by pain.  If I am able to respond to my pain 
at all, my response will be from the perspective of the doer engaged in a project and not from the 
position of the sufferer.   
In that sense, judgments made about pain by people who are in pain are more complex 
than Nagel would allow.  Contrary to Nagel’s claim, the position of the sufferer who is imme-
diately related to pain is not the one with evaluative authority.  It is only because pain is some-
thing one encounters while one is doing something else and one’s relation to it is thus mediated 
by being understood relative to that project that one comes into possession of the opportunity to 
make an evaluation of pain and the terms in which to evaluate it.  Any resulting judgment of pain 
will not arise out of the direct experience of being in pain, but will instead be a judgment of pain 
in the light of one’s projects, desires and values.  Thus it would appear that analysis of the condi-
                                                          
21 Research consistently indicates that not only will it be easier for me to manage the pain I feel, 
but identical stimuli will result in a different amount of pain sensation depending on various fac-
tors including whether I think there is a good reason I am in pain, if I think I have a choice and 
so on.  For a classic and brief exposition of important cases, see Pitcher (esp. 488-490).  For 
more scientifically up-to-date information, see Aydede. 
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tions of possibility for judging pain to be bad reveals that such things as projects, desires and 
values are behind such judgments, and the Kantian desire-conditional view of pain’s badness is 
vindicated. 
3.2 The Argument from the Structure of Desire 
There is another sort of argument for taking the Minimizer’s position over the Kantian’s.  
Goldstein offers this argument, and so does Joseph Raz.  Goldstein’s way of putting it is this: 
“Entailed by being a man [sic] is that one’s beliefs and desires will not arise randomly but will 
arise in conjunction with reasons” (Goldstein 1980, 354).  He thinks it would just be inconsistent 
with our general inclination to rationality for us to allow ourselves to be driven by a purely inci-
dental desire.  As rational creatures, we want to know what we have reason to desire.  If we dis-
cover a desire to be unjustified, it is troubling and we find we cannot endorse that desire, but not 
endorsing a desire just means abandoning it.  Raz allows an exception for what he calls “brute 
wants,” in respect of which we are purely passive, but claims that “philosophical desires” are ac-
tive and thus require an endorsement that can only come from an agent’s recognition of their 
propriety (Raz 1999, 50-56).  This model for understanding desires can be used to support the 
Minimizer because it suggests that our wanting to avoid pain depends upon our taking pain to be 
the sort of thing that merits being avoided, and that is no different from our taking pain to be 
something bad (whether for ourselves or others). 
My objection to this view is that a “philosophical” desire to avoid pain may be grounded 
in a perception of value other than the value of the pain itself.  So, suppose that people shape 
their lives in part through a desire to be happy and fulfilled and so on.  Such a desire would need 
endorsement based on the value of the goal it seeks to bring about (i.e. happiness).  Once put into 
effect, it would have the result of serving as a reason to avoid things that make one unhappy, 
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among which would be (certain kinds and amounts of) pain.  Thus people with a desire for hap-
piness would have a reason to minimize (certain kinds and amounts of) pain.  The reason to 
avoid pain would be desire-conditional, but it would not be conditioned upon a desire to avoid 
pain and thus the desire would not itself depend upon a prior judgment of pain’s disvalue.  Be-
cause under these conditions the desire on which the reason to avoid pain is conditioned is not a 
desire to avoid pain, Raz and Goldstein’s argument that a desire to avoid pain would require a 
perception that pain is worthy of such a desire is not relevant and provides no evidence against 
the desire-conditionality of pain’s badness. 
It may not be obvious that people actually think of pain in the way I have just described, 
though, so let me try to present some evidence that they do.  One way children learn about desire 
is by making Christmas lists of things they want.  Imagine if a child put on a Christmas list for 
Santa “to not feel the pain anymore.”  This would be a sign of great pathos and desperation in 
that child’s life and an indication that something had gone wrong (whether it was abuse or pro-
longed illness or injury).  It would be tragic not only because the child is suffering but because it 
suggests that the child’s orientation toward the world has been harmfully altered as a result of its 
suffering.  The child has shifted away from pursuing positive goals (“I want this, that and the 
other.”) as we would expect normal, healthy children to do and has taken up a fundamentally 
negative position of “Please, just not more of this.”  This example illustrates a general fact about 
the relationship between positive and negative values: the avoidance of the negative is not sym-
metrical with or analogous to the pursuit of the positive such that they are completely interchan-
geable as potential objects of desire.  Avoidance of the negative is different from pursuit of the 
positive in that it is normal and healthy to form desires in pursuit of the positive, but abnormal 
and a sign of ill-health to form desires to avoid the negative.  Since this is true, it looks like my 
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account of the desire-conditionality of pain’s badness is not just one possible way of understand-
ing how our desires might be structured, but also the way they ought to be structured. 
It may be objected here that children and adults are somewhat different.  It sometimes is 
the case that people have thoughts like, “Please dear lord, don’t let me feel anything like I felt 
when I broke my leg/had cancer/got dumped.”22  I would claim there is an equal amount of pa-
thos in such formulated desires as there is in the child’s.  When someone says something of this 
kind, it is a clear sign that they have not “gotten over” the pain that was caused by the previous 
incident.  A normal course of action to take in such a case is to help them through it so that they 
can let go and move on with their lives.  It is understandable why people would pray in such a 
way, but such prayers are nonetheless an expression of fearful desperation that people can and 
should seek to overcome.  Contrast the prayer above with its affirmative equivalent, “Please dear 
lord, keep me in good health and bring vitality and commitment to my relationships.”23 
We can and should make a point of focusing on what we want rather than what we don’t 
want.  To be “focused on the negative” even when this means focusing on avoiding the negative 
is a vice.  What I mean by that is not that we should not form negative desires or even that we 
should not form them unless we can see in advance the positive goals that can be advanced by 
means of them.  I mean it is important to develop a disposition to seek out an understanding of 
what affirmative desires (if any) are at work in grounding our negative ones.  The reason this is 
important is that a life lived in the avoidance of the negative has no evident intrinsic value and no 
hope of becoming worthwhile.  It is only when one can see particular instances where one is 
avoiding the negative as part of a larger project grounded in positive projects that one can see 
                                                          
22 Thanks to Andrew J. Cohen for this objection. 
23 I don’t mean to take a stand on theological issues here.  The point is just to see the difference 
in mindset, and to see that one mindset is preferable to the other. 
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such avoidances as actually an expression of an underlying affirmation of the positive value of 
one’s life. 
This does not seem to me to be a particularly controversial view, but perhaps it is worth 
illustrating it in order to make clear what I have in mind.  Suppose two people Margaret and Julia 
go to the beach.  Each recognizes that it is an uncomfortable reality that she will get a painful 
sunburn without sunscreen.  Taking this into consideration, Margaret accepts the necessity of 
wearing sunscreen and somewhat begrudgingly applies it before moving on with her day.  Julia, 
on the other hand, does not simply regard the application of the sunscreen as necessary in order 
to avoid a painful burn.  Instead, she considers herself to be engaged in taking care of the only 
body she will ever get.  Seeing it this way, she is able to take a certain satisfaction out of apply-
ing the sunscreen.  I think most people would rather be Julia, and I think they are right. 
 All of this suggests against the sort of move Singer employs in the quotation I employed 
at the very beginning of this thesis.  If his purpose in “Famine, Affluence, Morality” or “All An-
imals Are Equal” is to initiate ethical projects or suggest philosophical frameworks for them, I 
want to say that it may be an important problem for him that both of the projects he lays out in 
these essays involve an uninvestigated and apparently primary claim about the badness of suffer-
ing unpaired with any claims about what positive value in the world we should seek to promote.  
This may be a source of the “nagging moralistic” tone many have found in his work (cf. Di-
amond 1978, 469).  It may be his projects are resented for their proximity to the kind of despera-
tion that positive-thinking people enter into only begrudgingly.  As Cora Diamond puts it, “We 
cannot point and say, ‘This thing (whatever concepts it may fall under) is at any rate capable of 
suffering, so we ought not to make it suffer’” (470).  I meant to suggest here both that Diamond’s 
36 
 
claim is factually correct because of desire-conditionality and that it is consistent with whatever 
interest we have in not being desperate to acknowledge and act on that correctness.  
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4 TWO TYPES OF INTRINSIC BADNESS 
In the previous two sections, I sought to contest accounts offered by the Minimizers of 
what pain is, and of how we assess its value.  In this section, I turn to the issue of how we give 
content to the claim that pain is intrinsically bad.  I will seek to show that negative evaluations 
can be divided into two distinct types.  Since these two types of negative evaluations are directly 
at odds with each other, I will claim that the apparent consensus regarding pain’s badness is a 
superficial one unless the type of badness it has can be further specified.  The Minimizers might 
be thought to offer a specification of what they think pain’s badness entails in the form of the 
deontic principle they offer, which states that pain should be minimized.  However, I will seek to 
show that neither conception of pain’s badness entails any such principle, and further that the 
conception of pain’s badness according to which such a principle seems most justified is in fact 
inadequate. 
A brief initial point to be made here is that even if it is plausible to suppose that the deon-
tic component of the Minimization Thesis somehow specifies the import of the axiological com-
ponent, it nonetheless is not the case that an object’s having negative value can generally be tak-
en to be equivalent to its being “to-be-minimized.”  Likewise, an object’s having positive value 
is not the same as its being “to-be-maximized.”  It may be that one needs to make sure there is at 
least some of a thing in the world if one values it, and probably one needs to get more of it if one 
wants to encourage others to engage with it – but that need not involve anything like “maximiz-
ing” it.  You may value your uncle without trying to get any more of him into the world or even 
trying to get more of him into your life.  The same goes for disvaluing things.  If you hate a piece 
of art, you might not spend time looking at it, and might even discourage others from doing so, 
but that need not mean burning it so as to get rid of it altogether.  Thus, it is perfectly coherent to 
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accept the axiological component of the Minimization Thesis without accepting the deontologi-
cal component.  If we were to switch from “minimization” language to the language of “pursue” 
and “avoid,” which Minimizers are sometimes attracted to, the problems would only shift, rather 
than disappearing (cf. Goldstein 1989, passim).  This is because, for example, it isn’t possible to 
“avoid” feeling a pain that one is already feeling. 
To now turn to the issue of what intrinsic value does imply, there are at least two differ-
ent senses of the concept of “intrinsic value.”  These two different senses may turn out to have 
the same referent, but they are worth mentioning briefly.  On one hand, intrinsic value is based 
on the way something is “in itself” rather than on a relational property or extrinsic property it has 
(such as “being liked by Xs”).  On the other hand, intrinsic value can be indifferent to the source 
of the object’s value but be considered intrinsic because the object is desirable “for its own 
sake.”  It is that for the sake of which one ultimately ought to act and in that sense has “final val-
ue.”24 
If we are going to categorize pain as intrinsically bad, we need to know what specifically 
negative intrinsic value (or “disvalue”) is.  The first sense of intrinsic value can easily be ren-
dered in terms of disvalue: something that is bad because of what it is or an intrinsic property it 
has.  The second sense of intrinsic value is a bit harder to contemplate when it comes to negative 
values.  If we value some things (like a blanket, an uncle, friendship, peace, health) just for their 
own sakes, it might seem weird to talk about disvaluing something “for its own sake.”  It may be 
out of concern for our parents that we visit them in the hospital, and in that sense we may do it 
“for their sake” and thus as an expression of their value to us.  But it is not out of concern for the 
                                                          
24 While I think it is clear the concepts of valuing something “in itself” and valuing that thing 
“for its own sake” have different senses, I stop short of committing to Korsgaard’s claim that the 
extension of the two concepts is also different (cf. Korsgaard 1983). 
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devil that we ignore his temptations.  Not everyone agrees about this (e.g. Socrates may not), but 
it seems a bit strange to think that we owe it to the devil to treat him that way.  If not, it is be-
cause of rather than in spite of his badness that we lack an obligation to have regard for him.  If 
we treat him the way we ought to in light of his intrinsic badness, it may be that we do so for our 
own sake or for the sake of other things of positive value (e.g. God, the moral law, eternal life).  
This is just another way of putting what I already said in the previous section about the priority 
of goodness over badness and about disliking pain because it is an impediment to one’s positive 
projects.  Still, there is more than one thing that it can mean to value something “for its own 
sake” and if we sort out these different meanings, it will become evident what is weird about dis-
valuing something “for its own sake,” but also what is correct in that terminology.  Doing so will 
lead us to see two different ways of treating something as having negative value. 
In “Practice of Value,” Joseph Raz offers an account of what it means to value things. He 
says there, “The normal and appropriate way in which the value of things influences matters in 
the world is by being appreciated, that is, respected and engaged with because they are realized 
to be of value” (Raz 2001, 124).25  From the context, it seems Raz has in mind positive values 
here (the value of a good book, the value of equality), but one way of conceiving of negative 
value would be to regard it as being essentially the same as positive value insofar as the two 
means of “appreciation” are concerned.  Thus, if we are concerned that starvation in the Third 
World is bad, we should respect that badness by engaging with it in the mode of fighting to elim-
inate it.  However, it isn’t obvious that respect is the appropriate attitude to have toward things 
that are bad.  Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not – or, perhaps, there are different ways of 
                                                          
25 Raz introduces this notion in the context of a discussion of how values can be “unfulfilled” if 
they are not recognized.  The value of a great novel that is never read is “unfulfilled.”  I do not 
know if negative values could also be “fulfilled” or if it makes to think we ought to try to fulfill 
them in the way it might make sense to talk about fulfilling a positive value. 
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offering respect and so no one right way to do it.  To explain why, it is necessary to say some-
thing about what respect means and entails. 
To respect something in the moral sense means acknowledging the power of that thing to 
make claims on our attention, consideration and deference (Dillon 2010).  It has the important 
implication of stopping short of crossing a boundary and thus of marking out a sphere in which 
the respected object has authority.  For example, respect for persons means acknowledging cer-
tain rights that persons have including their right to have agreements we make with them hon-
ored and so on.  Such respect means acknowledging their authority to make a claim on us about 
what is owed to them.  The opposite of respect is the refusal to grant such authority and in that 
sense, it can usefully be called “contempt” or “disdain.”  To take something to be contemptible is 
to deny that it is worthy of the attention one gives it or the power over the course of one’s life 
that it claims or the consideration that one pays it.  If I have contempt for Newt Gingrich, but 
have to think about him anyway because he is in a position of social importance, I should resent 
this, since I don’t think he is worth the attention I nonetheless give him.  Unfortunately, people 
sometimes define themselves by their contempt for something and thus the thing for which they 
have contempt ends up indirectly making a very significant claim on them.  Such people become 
completely immersed in resentment.  It is a significant purpose of Nietzsche’s writing to show 
what is insane in this way of orienting oneself with respect to one’s values.  People who think 
contempt is actually an appropriate way of defining oneself may sometimes claim that things are 
“beneath contempt,” but  I find this phrase to being meaningless, since having contempt for 
something means taking it to be unworthy of one’s consideration and thus already means taking 
it to be beneath even the consideration required to have contempt for it.  Although contempt in-
volves a lack of acknowledgement, just not to giving something any thought is not necessarily a 
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way of showing contempt for it.  It must be that when this thing makes a claim on one’s attention 
which one might acknowledge, one nevertheless does not acknowledge that claim.  If something 
makes no claim, then it cannot be held in contempt.  For example, the ERAs of the Atlanta 
Braves pitchers might be something that you do not recognize to be of concern, but if this is be-
cause it has never occurred to you that you ought to be thinking about them, you do not hold 
them in contempt.26 
The paradigm case of contempt, for me, is the attitude nobles have toward slaves accord-
ing to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals.  The nobles, according to him, feel themselves to simp-
ly be above the slaves such that they do not occupy themselves thinking about them, don’t make 
it a point to prove themselves to them, don’t regard the slaves as their enemies in life.  In con-
trast, for the nobles, an enemy with whom one is going to bother “engaging” and thus value that 
much must be “one in whom there is nothing to despise,” thus, another noble, one’s equal (GM I 
13).  Hector and Achilles are enemies in this sense because each acknowledges the other’s talents 
and takes the other’s aspirations to be legitimate even as he seeks to overcome and defeat the 
other because the other’s aspirations are incompatible with his own.  If, however, there were not 
an essential equality between them, it would be impossible for the superior one to respect the in-
ferior one and they could not entertain the same kind of rivalry. 
Now, I want to say that it is because of the badness where something is “beneath” one 
that the idea of acting “for the sake of X” seems out of place when it comes to intrinsic badness.  
Nobles do not act for the sake of the slaves.  What it means for the nobles to contrast themselves 
with slaves and call the slaves “bad” just is “We do not do things for the sake of people like that 
because we cannot respect them – they are beneath us.  Only a slave (someone who could not do 
                                                          
26 Thanks to Tim O’Keefe for this and the Newt Gingrich example. 
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otherwise) would subject himself to acting in accordance with considerations he could not re-
spect.”  I think this notion of nobility or height and with it the concepts of contempt and disdain 
have an indispensible role to play in the concept of badness such that the Minimizers go wrong 
by leaving it out. 
Consider some contrasting examples of the role that contempt (and feigned contempt) can 
play in responses to parallel cases of “badness.”  As part of their training, elementary school 
teachers are told to ignore those who misbehave and instead direct their attention toward the stu-
dents behaving well.  Similarly, but with different intentions and results, the United States some-
times marks the badness of a foreign regime by refusing to (formally) recognize its existence.  In 
order for what the teacher does to work, it must not be thought by the student to be intentional or 
a matter of principle but rather to be a reflection of the teacher’s genuinely not taking an interest 
in what is happening.  In order for what the United States does to work, it must be known to be a 
matter of principle.  In the one case, the strategy is to get the moral concepts out of the way and 
render the student’s behavior mundane.  Bad behavior from students gets its power through be-
ing marked as rebellious; and of course the difficulty about rebellious students is that they may 
have contempt for their teacher and so resent being made to respect his authority.  The best re-
sponse is a noble contempt that apparently makes no demand for the student’s respect, but in-
stead entices the student to a change of heart through suggesting the possibility of what the stu-
dent wants (acknowledgement) if the student changes her behavior.  In contrast, the strategy the 
United States employs is meant to mark the regime as “beyond the pale” and is a way of scorning 
the regime in question.  It is thus meant as the harshest sort of moral condemnation and is a di-
rect demand for respect.  If the students were regarded as equals to the teacher, the appropriate 
response would be outrage at obnoxious behavior from the students.  It is thus at the cost of a 
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certain amount of respect for the students that the teacher is able to ignore their behavior.  It is 
because the teacher does not take them seriously that he is able to dismiss what he perhaps pre-
tends cannot be helped.  His lack of respect for them as they are might nonetheless be seen as a 
kind of respect for them as they might one day become insofar as he allows his vision of the val-
ue of those future selves to dictate all of his conduct toward the present ones.  In contrast, by in-
sisting on the illegitimacy of certain regimes and marking them as “beyond the pale,” the United 
States implicitly is showing respect for them as equals who can and should be held to certain 
standards of conduct.  Of course, even as the United States is respecting the regime by judging it 
as an equal, it is doing so by occupying a false posture of contempt through denying it an official 
recognition of this equality.  Although the two cases are quite different, what they have in com-
mon is that each involves a negative evaluation at the center of which is that something is “be-
neath” the evaluator.  Both involve a potentially other-regarding attempt to twist free of the bad-
ness perceived in the object toward which they are directed, and this twisting free is enabled by 
contempt. 
Whatever the behavior of the teacher and the US shows about contempt, they also show 
that our responses to badness in the world may veer in radically different directions depending 
on what, if anything, we respect in the thing we judge to be bad.  Crucially at stake whenever 
there is a problem about respect is the issue of what kind of power we want to give something 
over us or to acknowledge that it has over us.  In making that decision, we have to decide which 
of several kinds of claims it might make on our attention we are willing to grant authority. 
To see how these issues can arise in dealing with pain, consider that the Stoics evidently 
held that it is distinguishing of humans that we not only have the ability to contemn pain, but that 
we exercise that ability: 
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we are born for higher and better things [than cattle]. This is shown by the mental 
attributes we possess: a capacious … memory; an ability to predict the outcome of events 
that falls little short of divination; a sense of shame that moderates our desires; a sense of 
justice, the faithful guardian of human society; and a disparagement of pain and death 
that helps us endure suffering and face danger (Cicero DF II.113).27 
Our “disparaging” of pain is said here to distinguish us from animals.  Taking pain seriously and 
trying to avoid it is not exactly different from what animals do, but refusing to take it seriously 
(i.e. disparaging it) is both something humans sometimes do and something that plausibly diffe-
rentiates them from animals at least when it comes to their own pain, though certainly not when 
it comes to the pain of (most) others.  We might think that the Stoic treats his pain like the teach-
er treats the behavior of the obnoxious student.  He considers not what the obnoxious behavior 
feels like or what it means in itself, but turns his attention to the self out of which it arises and 
imagines who that person might become.  In the case of the Stoic, it is his own rational self that 
he chooses to ultimately have respect for, and he does so by holding the emissions of his animal 
self in contempt.  He regards his pain as such an emission, and directs his attention away from it 
if he can. 
It is not only the Stoics who disparaged pain, or called upon humans to do so in order to 
take up their humanity, or claimed that we already had done so, but also Nietzsche, who writes,  
I have given a name to my pain and call it ‘dog.’  It is just as faithful, just as obtrusive 
and shameless, just as entertaining, just as clever as any other dog—and I can scold it and 
                                                          
27 While the proper exposition of Stoic philosophy comes in Book III of Cicero’s On Ends, this 
quotation actually comes from Book II, in which his primary purpose is to critique the Epicurean 
position.  Nonetheless, Cicero has sympathy for the Stoic position and may be read here as criti-
cizing the Epicureans on behalf of the Stoics. 
45 
 
vent my bad mood on it, as others do with their dogs, servants and wives (Nietzsche GS 
§312). 
Whether or not it is meant to, this certainly inverts the famous opening line of Bentham’s Prin-
ciples of Morals and Legislation, wherein he claimed, “Nature has placed mankind under the go-
vernance of two sovereign masters, pleasure and pain” (Bentham I.1).  I see profit in its doing so; 
after all, as I have said, I do not respect the “sovereign” badness of pain, but instead believe that 
when it is bad, it is so only as an obstacle in one’s positive life projects. 
Still, this means I would not want to advocate utter contempt for pain.  Pain does have some 
importance to us.  A man on the rack cannot call himself happy.  What we need is a way to re-
concile competing demands on us.  On the one hand, we should not allow a desire to avoid pain 
to rule our lives.  On the other hand, we need a way to acknowledge and even respect the role 
that pain does play. 
I have serious doubts about whether it would be possible to give an account of when one 
should respect the authority of pain’s badness and when one should disparage that authority.  
Still, there are a few examples from what I have said thus far that could prove instructive on the 
issue.  The discussion in section 2, for example, included a suggestion that some pains such as 
grief are cognitive.  It was further suggested there that we ought not to let pain’s apparent bad-
ness hold sway when it comes to our beliefs.  We should have respect for the truth to be found in 
what pain expresses (in this case, the loss of a loved one), but reject the powerful claim that its 
unpleasantness makes on us to try and make it go away.  Still, I would not want to propose as a 
general rule that pains be regarded as representational states and evaluated according to whether 
they accurately represent some state of affairs, yet in this case, I think that is what is called for.  
In section 3, we considered the issue of “steeling oneself” against pain.  That seems to be one 
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legitimate way in which to respect pain’s badness, but one which can be taken too far.  We also 
considered the formulation of desires to avoid pain for its own sake, which I suggested can be 
perverse.  If we regard the formulation of such desires as a potential way of acknowledging 
pain’s badness, I would want to claim that we should deny it this recognition.  If it is part of 
pain’s power to put us into a desperate mood in which it seems the end of pain is all we can hope 
for, it is contempt for that power that may sustain us and put pain in its proper place. 
At any rate, I think what we see in the Minimizers is a failure to address themselves to the 
diversity of claims that pain makes on us and to the variety of ways that we might rightly re-
spond to or refuse these claims.  I have tried to call attention to places where their understanding 
of pain falls short not in order to build a better theory of what to do about pain, but to suggest 
that what to do about pain is a more complicated and troubled issue than they suggest.  What has 
been shown in the course of this thesis is that pain has the power to distort our desires and threat-
en individual autonomy (whether for better, as in the case of grief, or for worse, as in the case of 
chronic physical pain).  If taken seriously in the wrong way, pain can drive people to despera-
tion.  Allowed to run its course, pain can be all-consuming.  At the same time, avoiding pain at 
any cost can deprive us of important knowledge about the world and of the felt significance of 
our interpersonal relationships.   
Getting it right about pain will require a different approach to it than the one the Mini-
mizers attempt to take, an approach wherein the meaning of particular pains is regarded as in 
principle quite different from the meaning of pain as such and certainly different from the mean-
ing of unpleasantness, wherein judgments of the intrinsic value of particular pains are necessarily 
and rightly conditioned by desires external to those pains, and wherein these judgments involve 
47 
 
trade-offs between taking pain’s badness seriously in some respects and disdaining pain in oth-
ers.  
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